

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01

AECE-00 /087 W

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P R 150935Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 843

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 135

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0052

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD FEBRUARY 10-16, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. EAST AND WEST CONTINUED TO MARK TIME IN THIS SECOND FULL WEEK OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THE WEEKLY INFORMAL MEETING WAS CHARACTERIZED BY AN ACTIVE, HARD-HITTING EXCHANGE GOING BACK TO FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, WITH THE EAST HAMMERING AWAY AT THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE NATIONAL CEILINGS, PARTICULARLY ON FRG FORCES. AT THE FEB 13 PLENARY MEETING, THE WEST MADE THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIAL AND SECRET

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MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, AND THEN USED NATO

GUIDANCE IN REJECTING FORMALLY THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. THE CZECHOSLOVAK PLENARY STATEMENT ARGUED THAT THE EAST FAVORED SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS, THAT THE FREEZE PROPOSAL WAS A LOGICAL FIRST STEP IN THAT DIRECTION, THAT WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIAL BECAUSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE LEFT OUT, AND THAT THE ALLIES WERE TO BLAME FOR THE EXISTING STALEMATE IN VIENNA. AT A POST-PLENARY PRESS CONFERENCE, THE EAST WENT PUBLIC WITH ITS FREEZE PROPOSAL. THE ALLIED PRESS SPOKESMAN RESPONDED BY DRAWING ON CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP. END SUMMARY.

2. THIS WEEK'S INFORMAL SESSION WAS AN ACTIVE AND HARD-HITTING ONE, WHICH FOCUSED ON BASIC ISSUES. FOR THEIR PART, ALLIED REPS STRESSED THE CONFORMITY OF THE WESTERN APPROACH WITH THE AGREED OBJECTIVES OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THEY POINTED OUT THAT, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, TWO MAIN TYPES OF OBLIGATION WERE UNDER DISCUSSION -- OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FORCES, AND OBLIGATIONS TO LIMIT THE SIZE OF FORCES. THEY STATED THAT THE SECOND TYPE OF OBLIGATION WOULD HAVE A GREATER IMPACT ON WESTERN THAN ON EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, BECAUSE A LARGER PROPORTION OF NATO THAN OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS BELONGED TO COUNTRIES ALL OF WHOSE TERRITORY WOULD BE COVERED BY LIMITATIONS, WHEREAS THE TOTAL SIZE OF SOVIET FORCES, THE LARGEST FORCE ON THE WARSAW PACT SIDE, WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATION. ALLIED REPS SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE THIS IMBALANCE IN OBLIGATIONS INTO ACCOUNT IN CALCULATING REDDCTIONS.

3. WESTERN REPS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT, IN OPPOSING COLLECTIVE CEILINGS, THE EAST WAS IN EFFECT CLAIMING A RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE INTERNAL RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE INTEGRATED FORCES OF THE NATO DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. ALLIED REPS REJECTED THE WARSAW PACT CLAIM THAT THE PACT REDUCTION APPROACH WAS MORE SPECIFIC THAN THE WESTERN APPROACH. THE ALLIES NOTED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FORESAW REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES OF FORCE TOTALS, WHOSE SPECIFICS THE EAST REFUSED TO DISCUSS.

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THE EAST WAS IN EFFECT MAKING PRIOR WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION APPROACH A PRECONDITION FOR DISCUSSION OF THE NUMERICAL CONTENT OF THE EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL AND OF DATA IN GENERAL.

4. IN REPLY, EASTERN REPS REPEATEDLY CHARGED THAT THE ALLIES WERE SEEKING TO CHANGE THE OVERALL EAST-WEST FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA THROUGH THE ASYMMETRICAL

REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES PROPOSED BY THE WEST.
EASTERN REPS ALSO STRESSED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY THAT
REDUCTIONS COVER ALL FORCE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA,
INCLUDING AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR FORCES, AND EMPHASIZED
THAT EACH PARTICIPANT WOULD HAVE TO ASSUME CLEAR
OBLIGATIONS AS TO THE TIME AND AMOUNT OF ITS REDUCTIONS
BEFORE ANY REDUCTIONS TOOK PLACE. EASTERN REPS INSISTED
THAT EACH INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANT MUST ASSUME AN EFFECTIVE
COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE ITS FORCES FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS.
THE EAST PLACED HEAVY EMPHASIS ON FRG REDUCTIONS IN
CONNECTION WITH DISCUSSION OF THESE TOPICS.

5. EASTERN REPS RETURNED TO THEIR FREEZE PROPOSAL
AT THE END OF THE INFORMAL SESSION, BUT ONLY IN A RATHER PRO
FORMA WAY. IN RESPONSE, WESTERN REPS STATED THAT THE
ALLIES DID NOT WISH TO CONTRACTUALIZE EXISTING GROUND
FORCE DISPARITIES IN THE AREA. A SEPARATE NON-INCREASE
COMMITMENT WOULD MEAN FORMALLY RELINQUISHING THE WESTERN
RIGHT TO RECTIFY THESE DISPARITIES, BEFORE RECEIVING
REQUIRED WARSAW PACT ASSURANCES THAT THE EAST WAS
WILLING TO MOVE TOWARD ELIMINATING THE DISPARITIES.
EASTERN REPS DID NOT REPEAT NOT ON THIS OCCASION REVERT
TO THE CLAIMS THEY HAD RAISED IN THE INFORMAL SESSION
OF FEB 4 -- I.E., THAT THE US AND FRG INTENDED TO
INCREASE THEIR FORCES.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

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P R 150935Z FEB 75

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 844

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 136

AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
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AMEMBASSY WARSAW
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0052

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

6. ONE POSSIBLE SIGN OF FLEXIBILITY EMERGED IN THE INFORMAL DURING THE GIVE AND TAKE ON DATA. ALLIED REPS PRESSED ON HOW DATA WOULD BE HANDLED ON THE BASIS OF THE NOVEMBER 8, 1973 EASTERN DRAFT TREATY. EASTERN REPS SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSAL ENVISAGED THAT THE PROTOCOL SPECIFYING AGREED REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTAIN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE UNITS TO BE REDUCED AND THAT THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT PROPER WOULD SPECIFY THE AGREED PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO CALCULATE BOTH THE STARTING POINT OF REDUCTIONS AND RESIDUAL LEVELS. IN A BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH THE FRG REP, POLISH REP STRULAK INDICATED THAT A DATA EXCHANGE WAS NOT REALLY NECESSARY BECAUSE
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WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES WERE NOT SO FAR APART AS TO CONSTITUTE A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO REDUCTIONS. IN REVIEWING THESE EASTERN REMARKS ON DATA, THE AD HOC GROUP NOTED THAT THEY WERE MADE IN THE MIDST OF FAST-MOVING INFORMAL EXCHANGES AND WERE NOT RELIABLE EVIDENCE OF EASTERN FLEXIBILITY, BUT AGREED THAT THE WEST SHOULD SEEK TO PRESS THE EAST FURTHER FOR SIGNS OF GIVE ON DATA ISSUES.

7. AT THE FEB 13 PLENARY MEETING, CZECHOSLOVAK REP KLEIN LED OFF BY REVIEWING THE EASTERN POSITION ALONG STANDARD LINES, ECHOING THE MAIN POINTS MADE IN THE EASTERN PRESENTATIONS AT THE JAN 30 AND FEB 6 PLENARIES, BUT IN A MORE MODERATE TONE. KLEIN STRESSED THE SUBSTANTIAL GOALS OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, NOTING THAT THE NOV 8, 1973 EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR MORE THAN 15 PER CENT REDUCTIONS. HE ARGUED THAT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL WAS A LOGICAL STEP ON THE LADDER LEADING TO REDUCTIONS, AND WAS DESIGNED "TO UNDERTAKE SERIOUS SEARCH FOR THE WAY OUT OF THE NOT VERY ENCOURAGING SITUATION IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS." KLEIN CHARGED THAT, IN CONTRAST TO THE EASTERN POSITION, THE ALLIED REDUCTION PROPOSALS WERE NOT SUBSTANTIAL, BECAUSE,

"FOR EXAMPLE,....NUCLEAR WARHEADS WITH THE CORRESPONDING MEANS OF DELIVERY ARE LEFT OUT." TURNING TO WESTERN NO-INCREASE PROPOSALS, THE CZECH REP CRITICIZED ALLIED INSISTENCE ON A "LINK" BETWEEN REDUCTIONS AND A FREEZE, ASSERTING THAT THE WEST IS IN EFFECT DELIBERATELY BLOCKING NOT ONLY A SOLUTION TO THE NO-INCREASE QUESTION BUT ALSO PROGRESS TOWARD SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. KLEIN WAS PARTICIPATING IN HIS LAST PLENARY MEETING BEFORE RETURNING TO A NEW ASSIGNMENT IN PRAGUE.

8. IN THE WESTERN STATEMENT, CANADIAN REP GRANDE PRESENTED THE CASE FOR SUBSTANTIAL AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS, AND THEN USED NATO GUIDANCE IN REJECTING FORMALLY THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. THE CANADIAN REP AGAIN REVIEWED THE CURRENT ALLIED POSITION AND UNDERScoreD THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIED AIR NO-INCREASE PROPOSAL.

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9. IN THE FEB 13 POST-PLENARY PRESS CONFERENCE, CZECHOSLOVAK DEPUTY REP MEISNER UNVEILED THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. MEISNER SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL ENVISAGED THAT "ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ADOPT IN THE FORM OF A JOINT DECLARATION THE OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE MANPOWER OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE AREA FOR THE DURATION OF THE TALKS." HE SAID THAT THIS "NEW INITIATIVE" OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS OF "GREAT IMPORTANCE" AS A POTENTIAL BARRIER AGAINST THE ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE. MEISNER ADDED THAT IT WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO THE SLOWLY MOVING TALKS, WOULD IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WOULD HELP IN FINDING MUTUAL SOLUTIONS TO REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN PRESS SPOKESMAN REPLIED TO PRESS QUESTIONS ON THE FREEZE BY DRAWING UPON ALLIED PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN MBFR VIENNA 0031, WHICH IS BEING REPEATED BY SEPTTEL FOR CONTINGENCY PURPOSES TO ALL ADDRESSEES.

10. COMMENT: AS WITH PREVIOUS ROUNDS, THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF THIS ROUND OF THE VIENNA TALKS STARTED SLOWLY, WITH BOTH SIDES PLUGGING THE MERITS OF THEIR OVERALL NEGOTIATING PROGRAMS. ALTHOUGH THE EAST WENT PUBLIC WITH ITS FREEZE PROPOSAL, SOME EASTERN REPS HAVE INDICATED BILATERALLY THAT THEY DO NOT EXPECT THE WEST TO ACCEPT IT. END COMMENT.DEAN

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